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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-767
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REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, PETI-
TIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[December 14, 1992]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court in part and, joined by Justice White, Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice
Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment.
  I join the Court's judgment and Parts I, II, and IV of
its opinion.  I write separately, however, because I do not
agree with the Appropriations Clause analysis set forth
in Part III.  Justice Blackmun -would hold that the
Constitution does not forbid the return without an appro-
priation of funds held in the Treasury during the course
of an in rem forfeiture proceeding to the party determined
to be their owner.-  Ante, at 12.  Justice Blackmun
reaches this result because he concludes that funds
deposited in the Treasury in the course of a proceeding
to determine their ownership are not -public money.-  I
have difficulty accepting the proposition that funds which
have been deposited into the Treasury are not public
money, regardless of whether the Government's ownership
of those funds is disputed.  Part of my difficulty stems
from the lack of any support in our cases for this theory.
  In Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 154 (1877), we
stated: -[I]f the proceeds have been paid into the treasury,
the right to them has so far become vested in the United
States that they can only be secured to the former owner
of the property through an act of Congress.  Moneys once
in the treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropria-
tion by law.-  Knote is distinguishable in that the forfei-
ture proceeding in that case was final at the time the
appropriations question arose.  But the principle that once
funds are deposited into the Treasury, they become public
money-and thus may only be paid out pursuant to a
statutory appropriation-would seem to transcend the facts
of Knote.  That there exists a specific appropriation for
-`Refund of Moneys Erroneously Received and Covered'
and other collections erroneously deposited that are not
properly chargeable to another appropriation,- 31 U. S. C.
1322(b)(2), supports this understanding.
  Justice Blackmun relies principally on language from
Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331, 349 (1871), to the effect
that once a seizure of forfeitable property has occurred,
-[n]o change of the title or possession [can] be made,
pending the judicial proceedings, which would defeat the
final decree.-  See ante, at 12.  This language is dictum
rendered in the course of deciding a dispute over the
sufficiency of the Marshal's seizure of the property subject
to forfeiture.  But even if it were the holding of the case,
it would have no application to the present case, because
here there was a final decree entered by the District
Court in favor of the Government.  It is petitioner's
failure to post a bond or obtain a stay of that judgment
which has brought the present controversy to this Court.
  In any event, even if there are circumstances in which
funds which have been deposited into the Treasury may
be returned absent an appropriation, I believe it unneces-
sary to plow that uncharted ground here.  The general
appropriation for payment of judgments against the
United States provides in part:
-(a) Necessary amounts are appropriated to pay final
judgments, awards, compromise settlements, and
interest and costs specified in the judgments or
otherwise authorized by law when-
      ``(1) payment is not otherwise provided for;
      ``(2) payment is certified by the Comptroller Gen-
eral; and
      ``(3) the judgment, award, or settlement is payable-
      ``(A) under section 2414, 2517, 2672, or 2677 of title
28. . . .-  31 U. S. C. 1304.
Title 28 U. S. C.  2414, in turn, authorizes the payment
of -final judgments rendered by a district court . . .
against the United States.-  Together, 1304 and 2414
would seem to authorize the return of funds in this case
in the event petitioner were to prevail in the underlying
forfeiture action.
  But further inquiry is required, for we have said that
1304 -does not create an all-purpose fund for judicial
disbursement. . . .  Rather, funds may be paid out only
on the basis of a judgment based on a substantive right
to compensation based on the express terms of a specific
statute.-  OPM v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 432 (1990).
The question, then, is whether petitioner would have a
-substantive right to compensation- if it were to prevail
in this forfeiture proceeding.  I believe 28 U. S. C. 2465
provides such a right here.  That section provides: -Upon
the entry of judgment for the claimant in any proceeding
to . . . forfeit property seized under any Act of Congress,
such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant
or his agent.-  Although 2465 speaks of forfeitable
-property- and not public money, the property subject to
forfeiture in this case has been converted to proceeds now
resting in the Assets Forfeiture Fund of the Treasury.  I
see no reason why 2465 should not be construed as
authorizing the return of proceeds in such a case.  There-
fore, I would hold that 31 U. S. C. 1304, together with
28 U. S. C. 2465, provide the requisite appropriation.
  Because I believe there exists a specific appropriation
authorizing the payment of funds in the event petitioner
were to prevail in the underlying forfeiture action, I agree
with Justice Blackmun that a judgment for petitioner
below would not be -useless.-  Accordingly, I concur in the
judgment of the Court.